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Abstract
This paper studies the characteristics of investment in slave trade and associated trades in
France during the eighteenth century. The study of the accounts of an investor from Nantes,
Bertrand de Cœuvre, shows that his investment compared favourably with domestic
alternatives. It was more liquid, shorter and more profitable than private notarized credit
without being more risky. It was less risky and had a shorter duration than government debt,
without being less liquid or less profitable. The study of investments in a total of 238 ventures
from Nantes, Marseilles, Rouen, Bordeaux, La Rochelle  and  Saint-Malo confirms that
superiority from the 1710s to the 1780s. The fact that domestic investors and their capital
were attracted to the centres of intercontinental trade investment during the period
corroborates this conclusion.
Keywords: Profits, Slave trade, France, 18
th century, international trade.
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Introduction
According to Marx, the relations between European nations and the rest of the world
played a great role in the “primitive accumulation” of capital before the Industrial
Revolution
1. This view has been shared by Eric Williams
2 and, more recently the World
System school researchers: Wallerstein, Frank, Amin, etc
3. As the more striking aspect of
intercontinental trade before the eighteenth century was the triangular trade, a heated debate
has developed on the profits of slave trade. This debate has focused on the case of England
4.
However, the growth of trade between Europe and the rest of the world was not an English
phenomenon. The largest trading power in Europe at the end of the 1780s was France. Its total
intercontinental trade — including re-exports to the rest of Europe — was 25 million pounds
sterling against 20 million pounds sterling for England. Its growth since the 1710s had been
faster than the growth of English trade
5. As such, French trade is an important case to study
for anyone interested in the relations between Europe and the other continents during the
eighteenth century.
This paper studies the profitability of investment in French slave trade and related trades. It
starts with methodological remarks. They are followed by the examination of the attractive
character of the investments of a single investor, Bertrand de Cœuvre. The study of other
published investments confirms that investment in slave trade and related trade was more
desirable than domestic alternatives. Finally, the paper provides supporting evidence and
concludes.
Part 1: Methodological remarks
A typical French slave trade expedition would proceed in the following manner. An
outfitter would gather capital from investors under quasi-equity arrangement by selling ship
                                                
1 Marx (1867 (1993)), First book, section 7, chapter 24.
2 Williams (1944 (1966)).
3 Cf. Amin (1974) Frank (1978); Wallerstein (1980); Wallerstein (1989). This list is not complete. Cf.  Crouzet
(1972), p. 8 for Williams’s predecessors.
4  Cf. the debate around Inikori (1981) : Anderson & Richardson (1983) ; Inikori (1983) ; Anderson &
Richardson (1985) ; Darity (1985).
5 Arnould (1791), table 1 and 2, Davis (1969) for early 18
th c. English trade, Davis (1979), pp. 94-5, 102 and
110, for late eighteenth c. English trade.Guillaume Daudin
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shares. The outfitter would typically provide only a small fraction of the total outfit cost. The
ship would go to Africa, sell its goods and buy slaves and then go to the West Indies to sell
slaves. The proceeds of the sale would be transformed into colonial goods that would be
brought back to France and sold there. The proceeds of this last sale were then distributed to
investors. That took time, as slave cargo were more valuable than colonial goods cargo: a
single slave cargo required four to six direct trade operations with the West Indies to remit its
income in colonial goods
6.
To study the quality of investment, we have to look into investors’ accounts. Investors
provided capital. Income of captains and outfitters — that provided both capital and work —
should not be taken into account without estimating what share of their income went to work
7.
This is an additional difficulty we will not try to deal with.
The final profitability of a slave trade expedition depended crucially on how fast could the
proceeds of the slave sale be repatriated. This is just one of the example of the fact that profit
is only one aspect of the attractiveness of an investment. Liquidity, maturity and risk have
also to be taken into account to assess the quality of investment. Even thought eighteenth
century investors were not using modern tools to assess investments
8, we should. They allow
us to debate objectively around notions that investors understood and took into account:
profits of course, but also liquidity, maturity and risk. But these notions are all relative rather
than absolute. Slave trade investments should not be examined by themselves, but should be
compared to other investments.
There have been three ways of examining the attractiveness of investment in slave trade.
This paper will look into actors’ own accounts of profits
9. An alternative would be to study a
theoretical investment from estimates of prices and costs. Relying on the quality of numerous
estimates increases the chances of being mislaid by a single one of them
10. Yet another
approach, in the words of Inikori, is to “generalize about the profitability of the trade on a
basis of an a priori application of the theory of competition relating profits to market
structure”. This method depends both on a proper analysis of the existing market structure and
                                                
6 Tarrade (1972), pp. 113-5; Saugera (1995), pp. 237-8.
7 However it must be noticed that someone might be a “passive capitalist”, that is an investor, in regard to a
particular investment while being an “active capitalist”, that is an outfitter for another one.
8 Although it would be wrong to undervalue the sophistication of eighteenth-century investors: cf. Velde & Weir
(1992), p. 11.
9 Richardson (1975); Inikori (1983) and the replies; for France: Stein (1975)
10 Anstey (1975b); Anstey (1975a); Richardson (1987); Darity (1989); Richardson (1989).The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
- 4 -
on the proper use of applicable theoretical results. It is faced with two difficulties rather than
one
11. Looking into actual profit accounts is a more direct way to measure the quality of
investment.
Part 2: Bertrand de Cœuvre’s investment
The best published source available to study French profits in slave trade are the estate
accounts of Bertrand de Cœuvre fils. They have been fully transcribed and published by
Meyer in a book recently re-printed
12. Studying a source already published might seem
useless. However, the tools Meyer used to analyse these data can be improved on by using
modern investment evaluation instruments.
These accounts were established between 1794 and 1798. The last operation recorded took
place in 1796. The main two documents are a summary report of all the investments made by
Bertrand de Cœuvre and his father and a detailed report of the investments made by Bertrand
de Cœuvre himself. Out of these, the detailed report describes 29 investments for which no
money was owned anymore. Each investment is a share in a ship. The 29 investments
correspond to 65 travels: 39 slave trade ventures, 23 direct West Indies trade ventures, and
three miscellaneous ventures: one to China, one to India and one to “Amérique” — probably
the U.S.A. Returns coming from different travels by the same ship are aggregated. It is not
possible to discriminate between West Indies trade investments and slave trade investments,
as the same ship would do both kinds of travels during its career. For these investments, the
full schedule of cash inflows is given: we now exactly when the outfitters paid money to
Bertrand de Cœuvre. Information on outflows is sketchier: the costs associated with the
preparation of each travel — outfitting — are given simply with the year of the travel
13.
These 29 investments are the core of our analysis of the quality of investment in slave trade
and related trades.
                                                
11 Thomas and Bean (1974). The phrase is taken from Inikori (1981).
12 Meyer (1969). The data are to be found pp. 384-439. The discussion of the data by Meyer is pp. 215-224. A
copy of the data is available upon request.
13 An additional cost is given as well, associated to a particular travel, but without any date. It is named “Quote-
part des dépenses depuis la mise-hors”: I will suppose that this cost was incurred between the outfitting and the
departure of the ship. Some outflows lack a date. Here are the choices we have made to give them one. Last
investment on the St.-Charles (dossier n°5): 1777 (as this is given elsewhere as the last date of outfitting).
Second investment on the St.-Hilaire (dossier n°14): 1766 (as there is one investment in 1765 and one in 1767) ;
Last investment on the Le Quartier Morin (dossier n°37): 1778 (as this is given elsewhere as the last date of
outfitting).Guillaume Daudin
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2.1.   Rate of profit
The most popular measure of the quality of an investment is the rate of profit it provides.
However, this notion is not as useful as it seems. The rate of profit is the ratio between the
income coming from an investment and its price. But getting 5% of the capital over 30 years
or nothing during 29 years and then 150% on the last year are two different things, even if the
rate of profit and the maturity of both investments are the same. Two main standard criteria
are used nowadays to take into account the schedule of cash flow
14. The first one is to
compute the present value of an investment. However, that requires to use an a priori interest
rate as a reference. The second one is to compute the internal rate of return of each
investment. The internal rate of return of an investment is the interest rate that would make its
present value equal 0. To put it in other words, for an investment bought at year 1, it is the r
that verifies:
Erreur! Signet non défini.
The difficulty with using the internal rate of return is that the full schedule of cash flows
has to be available. That is the case for 29 of Bertrand de Cœuvre’s investments, made from
1756 to 1792, and for which no money was still owned in 1797. The internal rate of return of
Bertrand de Cœuvre’s portfolio was 6%
15.
That compares favourably with alternative investments:
– The maximum legal rate of interest, had been fixed at 5% in 1665. It was the same in
England. In France, it did not change until 1807
16.
– Because of legal problems linked to the notion of usury, there were only two
investment instruments in the traditional notarized credit: obligations and rentes. Obligations
were zero-coupon bonds. Only the date and the capital to be repaid was ever specified in the
contract: it is not possible to compute the interest rate. For that reason, we cannot use them in
this study. Rentes were perpetual bonds serving a constant interest. The capital and the
interest paid were specified in the contract: in Paris at least, “around 1750, the legal rate had
imposed itself to a great extent”
17. In the same way, the interest rate charged on rentes
                                                
14 Luenberger (1998), pp. 24-27.
15 We have taken into account inflows and outflows at the yearly level rather than the monthly or daily level. For
comparison, his rate of profit was 23%.
16 Postel-Vinay (1997), p. 86.
17 Postel-Vinay (1997), pp. 91-98, especially p. 92.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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converged toward 5% in rural markets
18.
– Short-term commercial interest rates varied much more, and yet, the mean of the
price of short-term loans between Paris and London was 4.99% between 1740 and 1790
19.
– It is difficult to point to a single interest rate for French government debt, as it was
not consolidated
20. Different assets had different interest rates depending on how strong was
their default risk. Starting in 1737, the state offered lifelong rentes at a rate of 10% per year:
that corresponded to an internal rate of return higher than 5%
21. That rate went up to 12%
during the Seven Years War (1757-1763), and after Terray’s partial bankruptcy in 1770,
varied between 6 and 8%. The most secure French debt obligations were the Rentes sur
l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris, and, after 1770, the October Loans. Their interest rates varied
usually between 4.8% and 6.5% between 1746 and 1792
22.
– Velde and Weir suggest that the level of interest rate was similar in France and in
England. That allows us to take into account English rates. In England, the interest rate on
mortgages was around 4.5%
23. In 1788, debt service was 7.5% of the French state debt, but
only 3.8% of the English state debt
24. English debt was remunerated between 3 and 3.5%, the
debt of Dutch public corporations was remunerated between 2.5% and 3%
25.
– Comparison of land prices and rents suggest that land investment had a
remuneration varying between 3.5% and 4.5% in England and France, including an presumed
.5% capital gain per year
26.
To sum up, the internal rate of return of Bertrand de Cœuvre’s portfolio was comparable to
that of the most secured French state debts. It was between 33% and 70% higher than the
return of a land portfolio, and 20% higher than a return on rentes.
2.2.   Risk
This high rate of return could be a compensation for extra risk. To affirm that slave trade
                                                
18 Rosenthal (1993), pp. 133-4.
19 Luckett (1992), quoted by Postel-Vinay (1997), p. 90.
20 Velde & Weir (1992).
21 Riley (1986), p. 176.
22 Velde & Weir (1992), p. 14.
23 Velde & Weir (1992), p. 19.
24 Crouzet (1993), pp. 58-76.
25 Net of tax. Thanks to Jan Luiten van Zanden for bringing this fact to my attention. Cf. Riley (1980), p. 72.
26 Cf. Velde & Weir (1992), p. 19: they quote debates during the nationalization of church goods and differentGuillaume Daudin
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was a risky lottery-like business is a banality. Despite insurances, the rentability of individual
expeditions varied widely. That is confirmed by the distribution of the rate of profit in the
Bertrand de Cœuvre’s investments, as illustrated in graph 1.
































However, the common idea that variance is a good measure of risk is wrong. The risk
premium associated with an investment is not linked to the variance of its returns, but to its
covariance with other similar investments
27. There are two types of risk: “private” risk is
associated with each individual investment whereas “market” risk is associated with the
whole sector. If private risk is high and market risk is low — high variance but low
covariance — it is possible to protect against risk by diversifying. In the absence of any large
covariance among the returns of slave expeditions, it was possible to create a safe portfolio
composed of small participations in many slave expeditions.
Graph 2 shows that Bertrand de Cœuvre fils did follow a strategy of investment
                                                
regional studies: Frêche (1974), pp. 568-73; Poitrineau (1965), pp. 513-514; Saint-Jacob (1960), p. 293.
27 The CAPM (Capital Price Asset Market) model is an illustration of that. Cf. Luenberger (1998), pp. 205-6.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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diversification.
Graph 2: Size and dispersion of Bertrand de Cœuvre fils’s annual investment
Units: Livres tournois
Source: cf. text. The length of each bar is the amount invested in that year. Each different coloured
section corresponds to a different investment. We have included the 47 investments for which the
schedule of investments is available. The total number of expeditions is 113.
For these reasons, it is difficult to say how successful his diversification was. Ideally, we
would need to compute the stochastic law governing the returns of each expedition and
compute the reduction in the variance of each annual returns caused by diversification.
However, this is tricky, because we cannot distinguish returns coming from different travels
of the same ship. Not so ideally, we can assess the regularity of returns by comparing them to
their yearly trend from 1763 to 1778 — as the period before is nearly not represented — and
from 1784 to 1793. This is done in graph 3. A three year moving average does track the trend
of returns well.
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Source: This is based on the 47 investments for which the schedule of returns is available.
It can be assumed that Bertrand de Cœuvre was indeed diversifying his risk away. The
question, then, is the measure of the market risk that slave trade was faced with. Wars had an
ambiguous role: they could be difficult times. Yet trading investment continued, under other
forms: privateers and the use of neutral ships. Furthermore, there preparation and their closing
were occasions for speculation — as it can be seen from the timing of Bertrand de Cœuvre’s
investment. The decline in trade during the Seven Years war was for example fully
compensated by the increase in trade before and after the war
28. Wars before the French
Revolution did not completely undermine the stability of the trading system. The real market
risk was the crumbling down of the plantation system: that actually happened during the
revolution with the slave revolts in Saint-Domingue.
Rentes were in a similar situation. They were not risk-less investments. Private notarized
credit was local, secured by collateral and grounded in the private notaires’ information.
However, notaires were not providing any formal guarantee and could be wrong; collateral
was often illusory — it was impossible for example to know if it had already been mortgaged.
Even if it was not, the actual recovery of collateral could only be accomplished through a
costly legal action
29. Moreover, this legal action was often unsuccessful: in particular,
collateral provided by peasant borrowers were often illusory
30. Traditional private credit
hence had private risks
31. The market risk was limited to generalized bankruptcy. That
happened through monetary crises twice in the eighteenth century, once in the late 1710s
32
and once in the 1790s
33. During both periods, debtors would refund creditors in highly
depreciated currency: there was a drop of 40% in the stock of notarised debt in Paris from
1718 to 1720. Nearly all pre-Revolution debts had been repaid by 1797
34 — a large part of
rentes being repaid in spring and summer 1795, when the value of the currency was less than
20% of what it had been before the Revolution
35.
                                                
28 Riley (1986).
29 Hoffman, Postel-Vinay & Rosenthal (2000), p.19.
30 Fontaine (2001), p. 44. She notices that this is confirmed by Boheler (1995), pp. 1180-1.
31 For more on the issue of imperfect information and collateral problems: Postel-Vinay (1997, )pp. 103-127;
Hoffman, Postel-Vinay & Rosenthal (1999), pp. 79-80; Hoffman et al. (2000), pp. 62-68.
32 Faure (1977).
33 Crouzet (1993).
34 Hoffman et al. (2000), pp. 308-312.
35 Hoffman et al. (2000), p. 188-192.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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In short, market risk was at least as important on rentes  as it was on slave trade
investments.
The market risk associated with the French state debt dwarfed the market risk associated
with rentes or slave trade investments. The state bankrupted in the 1710s during the Law
affair and during the Revolution. It also went through two partial bankruptcies in 1759 and
1770. Velde and Weir have studied the different private risk associated with each different
type of obligation. It is clear that the rate of interest on government debt included a risk
premium
36. Even the “surest” government debt had a risk that could not be diversified away.
2.3.   Liquidity
Liquidity is also an important characteristic of investment, as it made investors’ capital
available to them. Ship shares could be sold and bought without any legal difficulties,
sometimes even at auctions. Meyer suggests that this flexibility both crowed out and prepared
the development of modern-style negotiable share enterprises
37. The share of the ship owned
by Bertrand de Cœuvre changed between travels in five cases. This is confirmed by the study
of the number of travels per Bertrand de Cœuvre’s investment in table 1.
Table 1: Number of travels per investments (47 investments)
Number of travels per
investment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of investments 14 7 1 4 1 1 1
Number of travels 14 14 3 16 5 6 7
Average profit rate – 7.7% 11.8% 42.3% 11.4% 42.1% 50.6% 53.6%
This table shows that Bertrand de Cœuvre must have been able to sell ship shares between
travels. The average life of a ship was higher than one travel: if Bertrand did not sell ship
shares, it would be difficult to understand why nearly one half of his investments were on
ships that only did one travel. Furthermore, the inverse correlation between the profitability of
an investment and the number of travels it did suggests that Bertrand de Cœuvre was able to
sell the shares of non-profitable ships he owned. Slave trade was a liquid investment.
Private debt liquidity was certainly lower. It was formally possible to sell notarized long-
term instruments of credits, at least in some regions. However, transaction costs were very
                                                
36 Velde & Weir (1992), p. 19.
37 Meyer (1969), pp. 103-4, 113-4 and Carrière (1973), pp. 537-539.Guillaume Daudin
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high on these markets. The buyer of a rente had to be convinced that the debtor was trustful
and had to been explained the particular clauses of each contract. Private information was
difficult to transfer. 
In Paris, a bourse had been created after the Law’s bankruptcy. It developed as a resale
market for some state-issued assets after the late 1740s
38 and for a limited number of firm
stocks — for the Compagnie des Indes or the Caisse d’Escompte. However, exchanging
through this market had a cost, especially for provincial or foreign investors that had to deal
through Parisians agents
39. Furthermore, Hoffman has estimated that 80% of the state debt did
not have an active resale market
40. For example, the rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris were
treated as real estate and hence rather illiquid. Life annuities formed the bulk of state’s debt
and were not tradable once the “lives” they were attached to were specified.
Shipping investment was at worst as liquid as state debt. It was more liquid than private
debt.
2.4.   Maturity
Liquidity might not actually be an important issue. It is less critical to be able to sell an
asset if its maturity is only 3 years than if it is 15 years. To some extent, investing in short
term investment can mitigate liquidity problems. It does the same to market risk. If the
rotation of capital is short, it is possible to act quickly on new information.
The average maturity of obligations was 4.2 years in 1780s Paris
41. Rentes, at least in
Paris, had no ex-ante maturity, as it was never possible for the lender to ask for repayment:
the borrowers decided alone when (and if) the capital should be reimbursed. Their mean ex-
post maturity was 12.7 years in Paris in 1718 and 15 years in 1789
42. On rural markets, 20%
of  rentes  lasted more than 50 years: their median maturity was higher than 17 years
43.
Fontaine has studied the evolution a country gentleman’s portfolio from 1728 to 1748. Only 4
of the 35 rentes that were reimbursed by peasants were so in less than 10 years, whereas 16
were reimbursed 52 to 78 years after the lending. Other categories were not better at repaying
                                                
38 Cf. Velde & Weir (1992), p. 13-14, Hoffman et al. (2000), p. 111.
39 Antonetti (1963), pp. 162-174, Potter & Rosenthal (1997) Potter (2000)
40 Hoffman et al. (2000), p. 100.
41 Hoffman et al. (2000), p. 213.
42 Hoffman et al. (2000), p. 39.
43 Rosenthal (1993), p. 153.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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the money they had borrowed
44.
The record of maritime investment seems to be mixed. The long “queues” — payments
received years after the initial investment — were a striking feature. There were caused by the
difficulties of remitting credit in the West Indies. The mean maturity of the 82 Bertrand de
Coeuvre’s ship investments was between 17 and 18 years
45. However, most of the income
was actually collected in two or three years. Obviously a simple measure of maturity as the
length of the income stream is not enough. A generalised measure of maturity exists. It is
called the “duration” of an investment. Here is how it is computed
46:
Erreur! Signet non défini.
The “present value” of cash flows is simply their value discounted by an interest rate r.
Hence, the computation of a duration implies using a reference interest rate. This is difficult
to find in eighteenth century France. However, one can use the internal rate of return of an
investment to measure its duration: this is called a Macaulay duration.
The Macaulay duration does not depend only on the relative calendar of payment, but also
on the internal rate of return and the year chosen as a starting point for present values
computations. The median Macaulay duration of Bertrand de Cœuvre’s maritime investments
was 5.2 years. That is equal to the Macaulay duration of a hypothetical 6 year 6% rente, a 5.2
year obligation, or a 15 year 23% rente. Hence, Bertrand de Cœuvre’s investment had a much
shorter duration than what was available in the domestic economy.
Table 2 sums up our assessment of the comparative quality of Bertrand de Cœuvre’s
investment. For every characteristic, Bertrand de Cœuvre’s investment was equivalent or
better than the alternatives.
Table 2: Relative characteristics of different investments in eighteenth c. France:
                                                
44 Where the gentleman lived, in Dauphiné, it was possible to buy bonds giving both a repayment date and an
interest rate. But the repayment dates were not enforced. Cf. Fontaine (2001), pp. 43-45.
45 Meyer (1969), p. 219.
46 Luenberger (1998), pp. 57-62.Guillaume Daudin
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Trade State debt Private debt (rentes) 
I.R.R.  6% 4.8%-6.5% 5%
Risk Low market, high private High market, low private  Low market, high private
Liquidity Medium Medium Low
Maturity Short Long Long
Part 3: Other investments
The study of a single source is not enough to give a definite opinion on the quality of
investment in slave trade. There are no other sources of the same quality as Bertrand de
Cœuvre’s papers
47. Notably, there are only few extra data providing durations or internal rate
of return. Yet, it is possible to compute rates of profit for 238 other ventures. The computation
shows that Bertrand de Cœuvre profitability was not atypical.
3.1.   Data
Apart from the data we use in the preceding section, it is possible to compute the rate of
profit of 33 extra investments by Bertrand de Cœuvre and his father; for 37 ventures outfitted
by Chaurand from Nantes from 1776 to 1791
48. It is also possible to compute the rate of profit
of 1 venture that had van Alstein as a captain in 1769
49, and 3 ventures in which Dobrée had a
stake between 1784 to 1790
50. It is worthwhile to go beyond the boundaries of Nantes to
study intercontinental trade profits. From Rouen we know 41 rates of profit related to the
trade made by Dugard with the Canada and the West Indies from 1730 to 1755
51. From
Marseilles, we know the rate of profit of 17 ventures outfitted by Solier to the West Indies,
the United States and the East Indies from 1781 to 1791 and the profits of 3 ventures by
different outfitters to the East Indies
52. From Bordeaux, we know the profits of 25 expeditions
outfitted by Pellet and Gradis from 1724 to 1738 and of 8 expeditions scattered through the
eighteenth century
53. From Saint-Malo, we know the profits of 9 South Sea trade expeditions
                                                
47 Cf. discussion in Daudin (2001), chpt. V, 1.3.2.
48 Rinchon (1956), pp. 81, 112 and 126-7.
49 Rinchon (1964), pp. 285-91.
50 Stein (1975), pp. 786-7.
51 Miquelon (1978), pp. 202-3.
52 Dermigny (1960), p. 146 and passim.
53 Butel (1974), pp. 261-277 and Morineau (1973), pp. 5-14.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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from 1717 to 1735. We also have 9 rates of profits related to 47 ventures made by
Chateaubriand’s father from 1763 to 1778
54 and 1 rate of profit related to the activity of Meslé
de Grandclos. From La Rochelle, we know the profits of 7 investments made by Depont des
Granges after 1722
55. We have some indications on 11 country trade ventures in the East
Indies
56 and four expeditions by a privateer from Bayonne during the Seven Years War
57.
In some cases from Bordeaux and La Rochelle the author has not stated explicitly if the
profit rates were those of the outfitter or those of the investors. The main difference would be
the inclusion or not of commissions. However, accounts were reports of the success or not of
specific ventures. They were in priority made for submission to investors. The outfitter’s
specific remuneration was included in the costs in all the accounts I could examine. As such, I
am going to assume that all the sources we present here actually report investors’ profits.
The mean, non-weighted rate of profit in these 238 observations
58 is 28% (confidence
interval
59: 16-40%). This is higher than Bertrand de Cœuvre’s rate of profit, 23%. However,
some very high profit observations might play too large a role in determining the mean rate of
profit. If every profit rates are truncated at 250% is replaced by 250% (8 observations), the
mean rate of profit falls to 23% (confidence interval: 15%-30%); if every rate higher than
200% is replaced by 200% (9 ventures), the mean rate of profit falls to 21% (confidence
interval: 13%-28%). It is not possible to weight the observations properly. However,
replacing Bertrand de Cœuvre mean profit by investment (7%) by the rate of profit of its
portfolio (23%)
60, increases the mean rate of profit an all observations by two points.
Bertrand de Cœuvre rate of profit seem to have been representative of the whole sector.
This conclusion is all the more convincing as we have already reached a similar conclusion
through a different method of aggregation — by source instead of observation
61. However,
there are a number of possible objections to that conclusion.
                                                
54 Lespagnol (1997), p. 490, Roman (2001), pp. 67 and 195-203.
55 Clark (1981), p. 146.
56 Manning (1996), p. 75.
57 Vignes (1942), pp. 93-7 and 125-31.
58 One can find a more detailed examination of these sources in: Daudin (2001), chpt. V, section 2. These data
are available upon request.
59 At 5%, like all the other ones 
60 The difference is explained by the fact that less successful ships were not kept for more than one travel in
Bertrand de Cœuvre’s portfolio. Cf. Table.
61 Daudin (2001), chpt. V, section 3, especially table 70.Guillaume Daudin
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3.2.   Difficulties
The first possible objection relates to the large confidence intervals we observe. They are
caused by the existence of high private risk. Because of them, the research of a strict
statistically significant conclusion is condemned to fail. However, this is also the case in the
contemporaneous estimates of means of returns, because of the “mean blur” problem
62. There
is not much to do the remedy it, except obtaining even larger amount of data. Our estimation
already takes into account data an order of magnitude more abundant that has been the case in
the literature till now: it is not possible to go further. Statistical doubt shall remain. 
A second objection is that there might be a selection bias in our data. Success might have
attracted more curiosity than failure: secondary sources might give an undue place to
successful ventures. We have only used private account sources: the curiosity of the
eighteenth century public should not affect us. Considering the paucity of the data, it is
doubtful that twentieth century researchers were particularly picky. If something was
available, they took it. Their curiosity should not affect us either. The selection bias, then, can
only come from what data has actually survived in the archives. When a bankruptcy occurred,
account books were taken away from traders’ whims to be put in official archives: they had
more chances of having survived there than in private archives. In the same way, when
something went wrong, investors became less trustful and demanded to be given more details
on what was happening. As a consequence, the evidence on ventures was repeated in many
letters, dispatched to different places. It had more chances of surviving. The selection bias
should lead to an underestimation of the usual profit rate rather than an overestimation. 
A third objection is that the data used come from a range of different activities, not only
slave trade. This is necessary to gather enough data. The fact that actors of slave trade were
not specialists warrants it. Most of them — like Bertrand de Cœuvre — invested in all kind of
intercontinental trade activities. They must have expected comparable returns from their
different trade operations. Furthermore, there was a strong interdependence between different
intercontinental trades. That encouraged equalisation of the rate of profit. The data we use
also comes from numerous French ports. As they were all faced with a similar situation, the
rate of profit might not have been too different. Table 3 tries to assess if there is a systematic
difference between different activities and different harbours.
                                                
62 Luenberger (1998), pp. 214-5.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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Table 3: Rate of profit and number of observations by type and origin of venture
Harbour







33% 3% 21% – 10% 30% 20% West Indies
direct trade  43 18 2 9 1 73
20% 24% 77% 28%
?













– 21% 2% – 1% Canada or USA
and West Indies 1 8 9
– 22% 15% 3% 28% 10%
Miscellaneous
2 1 2 4 9
Average Profit 21% 5% 23% – 1% 20% 27% 77% 28% 19%
Number of
observations 103 41 33 20 19 11 7 4 238
This table could be interpreted as showing that rates of profit were very different from type
of venture to type of venture and from place of origin to place of origin. However, there is a
problem with the data: we observe expeditions from the entrepreneur’s book, not the
investors’ ones. Hence, specific port and activity rate of profit reveal something about the
success and failure of a particular entrepreneur rather than about the general investment
opportunities that existed in that port and that activity.
For example, Rouen, Marseille and La Rochelle strike as being atypical places. Yet, the
bad results of Rouen are based on a single source, the Dugard company. This company was
not very successful: it had to be liquidated among bickering between its outfitter and his
investors. Solier and Cie are behind the bad results in Marseilles. They were newcomers in
the trade, Swiss protestants sent there, or attracted there, by apparent high profits to be made
in the 1780s. They were not successful. Finally, the good results of La Rochelle come fromGuillaume Daudin
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operations all made in 1722, before the definite stabilization of the livre tournois: it is
possible that part of the this profits were simply due to monetary movements. Nothing be said
either of the differences between West Indies and slave trade for two reasons: most the “?”
come from Bertrand de Cœuvre père’s investments and might go in one or the other category,
maybe increasing the mean slave trade profit; the low slave trade profits are associated with
Bertrand de Cœuvre fils’s expeditions: we have seen that it is depressed by the absence of
weight. The bad results of the Canada trade are associated with Dugard’s unlucky business
career. It is possible to tell a story for every number that comes out of Table 3 to show that it
was not “typical” of its sector or port. To that extend, the general mean represents more than
the mean for individual ports and activities.
A fourth objection would be to cast doubt on the stability of the rate of profit throughout
the period. Graph 4 shows that there is nothing to indicate that there was any trend in the
evolution of the profit rate.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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Graph 4: Evolution of profits (truncated at 150%) through time
(The vertical axis is the truncated rate of profit)
This is reinforced by the computation of time trends. If the data is truncated at 250%, there
is positive time trend. If it is truncated at 150%, there is a negative time trend. Neither one nor
the other is statistically significant.
A closer look at the data confirms that Bertrand de Cœuvre’s rate of profit were not
atypical. If his schedules of income were typical, we can conclude that the usual internal rate
of return in the sector was comparable to his and superior to the usual internal rate of return in
the economy. There are reasons to believe that Bertrand de Cœuvre’s schedules of income
were not typical, but they reinforce our conclusion. 90% of his ventures started after the
Seven Years war. The net position of plantation owners declined particularly toward the end
of the Ancien Régime, to the extent that their debts were more and more difficult to recover:
that must have reduced Bertrand de Cœuvre’s internal rate of return compared to his rate of
profit. 73% of his ventures were at least partly slave trade ventures. Buying slaves was the
main reason why plantation owners in the West Indies had to go into debt. Hence, slave trade
was more prone than other trades to long repayment period. This also must have reduced
Bertrand de Cœuvre’s internal rate of return compared to his rate of profit.
Year








Part 4: Movements of people and capital
The two preceding sections have given reasons to believe that investment in slave trade
and related activities had better characteristics than domestic alternative. This conclusion is
reinforced by the observation of movements of people and capital.
The French harbours attracted people from all the rest of the country. We know the origins
of 166 Nantes families involved in colonial trade in the second half of the
eighteenth century
63. The local bourgeoisie had been at the centre of the late 17
th century
expansion, but it did not represent more than 9.4% of the trading families in the second half of
the eighteenth century. Most immigrants were traders from the interior economy. We know
the profession of the father of 92 immigrants: 59 were coming from trading families.
Migration from other French ports — like Bordeaux —, or from maritime Western France —
that sent penniless nobles or families ascending the social ladder — was the exception rather
than the norm. In Marseilles, the number of négociants increased from 275 at the end of the
17
th c. to 450 around 1750 and to 750 at the end of the Ancien Régime. Négociants from
outside Marseilles were 18.7% of the total at the beginning of the century, 24.6% in the mid-
century and 46.3% at the end of the Ancien Régime. The Solier — whose activity has been
studied by Dermigny
64 — are a good example of the migrating movement
65. As Carrière said:
‘The migration curve follows closely the expansion curve, and that is to be expected’
66. In
La Rochelle at the end of the Ancien Régime, only 58% of the ship outfitters came from the
town or the adjoining regions: Aunis, Saintonge, Guyenne and Gascogne. In Lorient at the
same time, 63% of the ship outfitters did not come from the town but from the neighbourhood
dioceses — especially Vannes. In Bordeaux, “the majority of the ship outfitters were
strangers to the region: either Languedoc protestants, Bretagne and Bayonne catholics or
aliens like the Bethmann from Frankfort”
67. That can be observed for earlier trade
prosperities: in the 17
th century, “the Saint-Malo capitalist centre was […] the heir of the
Vitry centre”; “the Saint-Malo trading group was open […] it became larger throughout the
                                                
63 Pétré-Grenouilleau (1996), pp. 18-41.
64 Dermigny (1960).
65 Carrière (1973), pp. 265 and following.
66 However, a caveat must be added to this sentence. That was true in the long and medium run. However, in the
short run, times of crisis offered opportunities that facilitated the entry of new comers.
67 Cf, quoted by Pétré-Grenouilleau: Bouniol (1972 ); Moutet (1974 ); Butel (1974), p. 16.The quality of slave trade investment in eighteenth century France
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17
th century by attracting dynamic elements from the cities and ports in its attraction zone”
68.
Once they were there, these entrepreneurs accumulated capital. In return, this capital did
not move out of the intercontinental trade sector easily. That is especially clear in the facts
accumulated to study the effect of trading capital in industry. In the case of Nantes, Pétré-
Grenouilleau reminds us that after the “starting” period of industries, intercontinental traders
had a tendency to get their capital back:
“All in all, two phases can be distinguished. The first one is contemporaneous with the
birth of large colonial trade: the trading community tried then to create the industrial fabric
that was to complement its own speculations (sugar factories, calico printing). The second
phase starts very early, probably even before the mid-century. It is characterized by a clear
withdrawal. This withdrawal became obvious just before the Revolution”
69.
Boulle notices that, even before the Seven Years war, intercontinental traders did not
invest outside Nantes. He remarks that “the range of investments from Nantes was limited”.
He underlines that in Le Havre, capital was moving from industry to trade rather than the
reverse around the mid-century
70.
Centres of investment in slave trade and other related activities attracted talents during the
whole eighteenth century and retained capital. That would not have been the case if their
activity had not been advantageous compared to domestic alternatives. 
Conclusion
This paper first clarified a number of methodological issues related to the measure of the
characteristics of slave trade investment. Then it has studied both the portfolio a specific
investor in slave trade and the other available sources. Finally, it has looked at the movements
of capital and of people. That has allowed this paper to reject two opposite points of view.
The first one is that slave trade and associated activities were providing private agent with
huge returns, twice or thrice as high as what could be obtained in domestic activities. There
was nothing “fabulous” in the returns of slave trade. The second hypothesis is that rate of
return of inter-continental activity was not higher than the rates of return of domestic
                                                
68 Lespagnol (1997), p. 88.
69 Pétré-Grenouilleau (1996), p. 82.
70 Boulle (1972) p. 98; Boulle (1975), pp. 320-321.Guillaume Daudin
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investment. That was not the case either. However, the idea that these higher rates contributed
to some “primitive accumulation” seems misguided, as the ports attracted talents and retained
capital
71. But if there was continuous entry into the sector, how come it kept providing higher
returns to its actors?
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